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ment has been rendered and appeal taken, the Secretary is to
print the name of the successful district court litigant upon the
ballot, thus mooting the appeal, if no decision on appeal has been
had prior to the voting period. Noting that parties would be.
deprived of any legislatively authorized procedure to contest an
election if invalidated, and further noting that election matters
are beyond control of the judiciary in the absence of special au-!
thority, the court dismissed the appeal. It thus treated as a po-
litical question the legislative decision to make a district court
judgment final where necessary to provide absentee ballots an
appropriate period before an election.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
ASSESSMENTS
Municipalities are authorized by the legislature to "levy and..
collect local or special assessments on the real property abutting
the improvements . . . sufficient in amount to defray the total
cost of the works. . . ."' In Williams v. City of Shreveport,2 the
municipality had assessed the cost of improvements to a street
entirely upon the abutting privately owned property, although
city property as well as privately owned property abutted there-
on. This was deemed in accordance with its authority to levy an
assessment sufficient to cover the total cost of the improvement..
A court of appeal rejected the underlying argument that public.
property, because exempt from taxation, was also exempt from
assessment; as to abutting public property, the city must pay an
assessment thereon as an agent of the entire body of citizens,
who are assumed to that extent to benefit. The fact that the
public property consisted of esplanades along the middle of the
boulevard was not deemed to change the result, since they were
not part of the street and as such occupied the position of ordi-
nary abutting property.
In Bussie v. Long,8 our supreme court has now approved a
"public" action 4 for a writ of mandamus directing the tax com-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 33:3301 (1950).
2. 241 So.2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
3. 257 La. 623, 243 So.2d (1971).
4. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 483-86 (1965)
for analysis and defense of this development.
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mission to establish actual cash value of taxable property in the
state and fix the percentage of such value upon which ad valorem
taxes must be assessed and collected. Rejecting the defense that
such an order would trench upon the discretion of the commis-
sion, the court held that while the establishment of actual cash
value of property involves a judgment factor, as does fixing per-
centage of the value appropriate for a uniform tax base, none-
theless, the statutory duty to establish actual cash value and fix
such percentage is mandatory, direct, and positive. The court
therefore concluded that the duties ordered to be carried out
were ministerial duties imposed by law and subject to judicial
mandate within the meaning of article 3863 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. A dissenting Justice would have limited the tax-
payers to the procedure permitting one who has filed a sworn
list of his property to test, in an appropriate court, the correct-
ness or legality of any assessment made against the property
listed on such return. It seems apparent, however, that this
private remedy would be relatively useless in accomplishing
state-wide equalization of property valuation.
That adjudication of property to the state for unpaid taxes
may involve unanticipated consequences was demonstrated in
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Asset Realization Co.6
During the period when title to property was in the state, a ser-
vitude over the property was granted to the police jury of Jeffer-
son Parish; when a certificate of redemption was thereafter issued
to the taxpayer-owner, the certificate duly recited this fact.1
Subsequently, an insurer was called upon to pay damages for
partial eviction upon the servitude being exercised; it success-
fully sought indemnification and the indemnitor in turn sought
payment from the parish. The court held that, since the indem-
nitor bought under a certificate of redemption clearly reciting
the servitude granted, it was entitled to no relief from the parish;
whether the state had authority to grant a servitude over prop-
erty while adjudicated to the state for unpaid taxes was left in
abeyance.
SALES AND UsE TAXES
In enacting a use tax to supplement the sales tax, the legis-
5. LA. R.S. 47:1998 (1950).
6. 237 So.2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
7. The parish cited LA. R.S. 41:91, 92, 94, 1171, 1172 (1950) as authority
for the granting.
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lature levied the tax upon the "cost price of each item" without
indicating at what point in time the cost price was to be calcu-
lated.8 In Mouton v. Klatex9 a court of appeal determined that
this left open the issue as to whether cost price included cost of
transportation. The court held that such transportation costs
were included, rejecting an argument based on a Florida statute
using the language "the cost price as of the moment of purchase
.... "1o Without such language in our statute, the court con-
cluded, it was not plausible to assume that cost price was the
cost price arranged for out of the state separate and apart from
transportation costs. It seems equally plausible to argue that
imposition of sales tax upon the sales price of an article would
include the cost of transporting the article to the point of sale,
but in Dunham Rentals Inc. v. West Feliciana Parish School
Board" a court of appeal rejected a levy of parish sales tax upon
the transportation cost of gravel on the ground that "sales of
services" did not specifically include sales of transportation ser-
vices. Under Mouton, had the parish levied sales tax upon the
sales price of the commodity rather than separately upon the
sale of the transportation services, presumably it would have
been upheld.
In St. John the Baptist School Board v. Marbury-Pattillo
Construction Co., 12 a contractor was persuaded after informal
negotiations that he was liable for school board sales and use
taxes on materials utilized in the construction of a grain terminal.
The school board, not acquiescing in the amount of taxes volun-
tarily paid, assessed additional tax on an estimated base and filed
suit for this amount, plus interest and attorneys' fees. A court of
appeal held that it was error on the part of the trial court to ac-
cept the estimated base for the tax since it consisted of the entire
amount of the contract plus an additional arbitrary sum added
to cover on-site equipment. Noting that the tax was levied only
on tangible personal property purchased, used or consumed in
the parish, the court re-examined the evidence, disallowed the
on-site equipment, deducted 20% as allowance for profit and
overhead, and estimated that 60% of the remainder was subject
to tax as materials purchased. It also disallowed interest penal-
8. LA. R.S. 47:302(A) (1950).
9. 238 So.2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
10. Id. at 2.
11. 241 So.2d 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
12. 239 So.2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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ties on the theory that the taxpayer was in good faith in resisting
the tax. An attempt to impose the tax liability on the port com-
mission for which the terminal had been constructed was rejected
on the ground that the commission was only a purchaser, not a
purchaser-dealer, and hence exempt within the statute.'3 A dis-
senting judge would have rejected the suit on the ground that
in proceeding by estimate it was attempting an illegal jeopardy
assessment; the court was willing to characterize the suit as
properly brought, however, subject only to the objection that
the assessment was based on an arbitrary and unreasonable
calculation.
In Collector of Revenue v. J. L. Richards & Co.,'1 4 a provi-
sioner for off-shore oil rig crews resisted a sales and use tax on the
ground that the provisions were not used within the State of
Louisiana and on the further ground that the provisioner was not
a dealer and hence not subject to the tax. Since the tax is clearly
levied upon sales as well as use, and finding that a sales incident
-"appropriation to the contract"-had taken place within the
state, the court held provisioner properly subject to the tax. No
difficulty was encountered in sustaining an occupational tax upon
the provisioner, based upon the gross annual receipts of the
contracting business carried on within the state.
In 1970 the legislature authorized the parish of East Baton
Rouge to levy additional sales taxes and to bond the proceeds. 15
An ordinance was adopted levying such tax and an authorizing
resolution adopted. In Liter v. City of Baton Rouge,16 authority
to levy the tax and bond the proceeds came under attack on the
ground that the bond issue was unconstitutional absent a vote
of the taxpayers. Reading the constitution as providing for the
issuance of bonds without a referendum only where the bonds
had a maturity not exceeding ten years and bore interest at a
rate not exceeding 5%,11 the supreme court held that the bonds
did not meet these conditions and could be authorized only as
general obligation bonds after approval by the property taxpay-
ers.18 The court rejected an argument that the general obliga-
tion bond provision related only to bonds supported by ad va-
13. Id. at 393.
14. 247 So.2d 151 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
15. La. Acts 1970, No. 559, 561.
16. 258 La. 175, 245 So.2d 398 (1971).
17. LA. CONST. art XIV, § 14(e).
18. Id. § 14(a).
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lorem taxes, since voting was only by property taxpayers; prior
to Cipriano v. City of Houma,19 virtually all bond-authorizing
enactments contained this limitation with respect to property
ownership, even though the bonds were not necessarily to be
supported by ad valorem taxes. The constitutional provision
states only that the governing authority "shall impose and collect
annually, in excess of all other taxes, a tax sufficient to pay the
interest .... -2o This language was held manifestly to contem-
plate bonds supported by more than one kind of tax; issuing
such "sales tax" bonds without referendum was therefore un-
constitutional. 21
PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
William E. Crawford*
Partial Judgments
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Walker v. Jones' has writ-
ten an opinion which may have traumatic effects on article 1915
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 2 dealing with the authority of
the trial judge to render partial final judgments. The court held
that a trial judge may, in the same case, render one final judg-
ment on the main demand and another on the incidental demand.
Walker sued Jones and the State Department of Highways
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident in-
19. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
20. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 14(a).
21. 258 La. 175, 193-203, 245 So.2d 398, 406-08.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 257 La. 404, 242 So.2d 559 (1970).
2. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1915: "A final judgment may be rendered and
signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party all
of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the
case, when the court:
"(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the plaintiffs, defendants,
third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or interveners;
"(2) Grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as provided by
Articles 965, 968, and 969;
"(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles
966 through 969; or
"(4) Renders judgment on either the principal or incidental demand,
when the two have been tried separately, as provided by Article 1038.
"If an appeal is taken from such a judgment, the trial court neverthe-
less shall retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining issues in the case."
